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O B J E C T I O N S  
T O T H E  
C O N T I N U A N C E  
O F T H E  
*W A R*  
E X A M I N E D A N D R E F U T E D.

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By JOHN BOWLES, Esq.

AUTHOR OF

“THE REAL GROUNDS OF THE PRESENT WAR,” &c. &c.

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THE SECOND EDITION:

WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS.

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“If, then, there be any-where a Nation of a restless and mischievous disposition, always ready to injure others, to traverse their designs, and to raise domestic troubles; it is not to be doubted that all have a right to join, in order to repress, chastise, and put it ever after out of its power to injure them.”

VATTEL,

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M,DCC,XCIV.



## ADVERTISEMENT.

**I**F, in reasoning upon the subject of the present War, we would avoid error, it is necessary to keep in constant remembrance, that the War itself differs so essentially from all former Wars, as to have little in common with them but the name. In every period of the World States have been obliged to resort to hostilities, in order to repel Ambition, to resist Injustice, to preserve Religion or Independence. An Enemy of a new kind has risen up—one who fights not merely to subdue States, but to dissolve Society—not to extend Empire, but to subvert Government—not to introduce a particular Religion, but to extirpate all Religion. In the natural impulse which leads to resistance for the sake of preservation, and in the union which arises from a sense of common danger, may be found the true principle of the War, and of the extensive Alliances by which it is supported.

It is perhaps as remarkable as any other circumstance of the War, that in the various States which are now defending their existence there  
should

## ADVERTISEMENT.

should be found persons, who, without being able to plead indigence as an excuse for desperation, oppose so necessary a defence, and who contend that it should not have been undertaken; and being undertaken, that it ought to be abandoned. To counteract such assertions, and to refute the insidious reasonings by which they are supported, is the principal design of the following Pages.

SEPT. 30, 1793.

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\* \* IN THIS EDITION it has been thought expedient to enlarge upon several of the topics before noticed, and to discuss others to which subsequent events have given rise; while, to avoid exceeding those limits which an attention to *general* utility seems to prescribe, the reflections which appeared in the former edition on the form of Government applicable to France, and particularly on the Constitution of 1789, have been omitted, and are reserved for future publication, upon a more extensive scale of discussion, in the form of an APPENDIX.

MARCH 1, 1794.

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## OBJECTIONS, &c.

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**E**VERY friend to humanity must anxiously desire the termination of the anarchy of France; and a vast majority, both in Parliament and of the Nation at large, look to a vigorous prosecution of the present War as the only means of averting the horrors with which that anarchy menaces the rest of Europe. There are, notwithstanding, persons to be found, who deprecate the success of this War, and who endeavour, by every obstacle they can throw in its way, to impede its progress, and to bring it to a premature conclusion.

THE public mind is incessantly addressed on this important subject by a variety of artful and specious reasonings, tending to abate that general and zealous support by which the War has been eminently distinguished, and on the Continuance of which its success essentially depends: and  
often,

often, without any reasoning at all, the commonplace topics which War, alas ! so copiously supplies, are resorted to, in order to increase that restlessness which such a situation naturally tends to inspire. While, however, endeavours are thus used to promote an unavailing impatience for the blessings of peace, the important question, whether peace be at present within our reach, is either altogether suppressed, or uncandidly taken for granted in the affirmative. But who can entertain an idea of present pacification, without shutting his eyes on the actual state of France ? For, laying aside every feeling of pride, national dignity, and resentment, will any one seriously maintain the proposition, that the present rulers of that distracted country can give the least security for the performance of any terms they might agree to ? Were they to pass through the forms of negociation and treaty, it would be only to relieve themselves from that pressure which they find it is impossible to sustain much longer\*.

\* By the Constitution of 1793, the Republic is declared to be *indivisible*, and it is decreed that no peace shall be made with an enemy who occupies any part of the Territory of the Republic. The necessary preliminaries of peace are therefore the cession of Savoy and Nice, and the dereliction, not only of the strong places which we have acquired with so much difficulty on the Frontier of France, but also of Austrian Flanders, Liege, &c. which still form a part of the nominal Republic, under the title of the Department of Jemappe, and Deputies from which continue to sit in the Convention.

BUT

BUT the State that should rely either on their good faith or their ability to keep their engagements, would justly become a victim to its temerity. A treaty implies the existence of two solid parties, reciprocally bound, possessing mutual confidence, and able to enforce and guaranty their respective stipulations. But in the present instance, the engagement would be wholly on one side. There would in effect be but one contracting party. The established Governments of Europe can indeed lawfully and validly engage for their respective States; but where is the Government to engage for or to bind France? The lawless ruffians who to-day are uppermost, may to-morrow be themselves the victims of a new Revolution—and their successors, far from recognizing their acts, may denounce them for having treated with Tyrants, as their greatest crime—and execute them upon a charge (among other things) of making peace, as they have executed their predecessors on a charge of having involved the Republic in War with England and Holland \*. Or perhaps, to escape such

\* It is a memorable circumstance, that the Faction which at this moment has the ascendancy in France; employed as one of the means by which they supplanted their predecessors, an accusation that the latter had wantonly and unnecessarily provoked the War with England and Holland. Can any other proof be necessary to shew that the War was unavoidable on our part? Or can there be more decisive evidence that the exertions of Great Britain are inexpressibly galling to the common enemy? The Brissotines thought themselves, with the aid of insurrection, a match for the whole world.—The  
Maratists

such a fate, the present ruling party would make a merit of perfidy, avow that they employed negotiation only as a snare (which would doubtless be the real truth), and renew their hostile attacks with additional fury, and with greatly increased advantages. In short, while the actual state of France forbids all confidence in its assurances or engagements, the system which there

Maratists find that it would have been better if the former had left them only the Emperor and the King of Prussia on their hands; and they would possibly be willing to postpone our turn, until they can put it out of our power to have such powerful Allies. Feeling the weight of our arm, they would perhaps, for the present, prefer our neutrality to our hostility; but being plunged in the War upon so extensive a scale by the rashness of those who preceded them in power, they still at times indulge themselves with the hope of accomplishing their object, difficult as it is become. They enjoy in a moment of success the prospect of humbling the "Commercial, Aristocratical, Banking, Royal City of London;" and of extending their anarchical sway from the capital of the Spanish to that of the British Empire (see the Report of *Barrere* on the recapture of Toulon). Can any one doubt that in such moments they prey in imagination upon those Neutral Powers which, by furnishing them with supplies, enable them to maintain their cause? Are not the Governments of those States, the present friendship of which they apparently court, as much the objects of their aversion as those with which they are at war? Has not their emissary introduced a Jacobin Club into Genoa, and expressed a hope that the people there would soon prevail over their Government? Nay, have we not the authority of Washington to assert, that their Plenipotentiary has endeavoured to excite discord, revolt, and anarchy in America? To all regular and established Government they have an inseparable aversion;—and they feel as much sympathy for the *Sans Culottes* of Denmark, Genoa, and America, as for those of Brabant and Germany.

prevails

prevails is incompatible with tranquility, foreign or domestic. War is its only element; the vital principle by which alone it can be fed. Such a state of society cannot be held together by any other tie.—Productive of turbulence and molestation in proportion to its progress from the commencement of the Revolution, all attempts to obtain peace otherwise than by the entire destruction of this system, would tend only to place the acquisition of that invaluable blessing at a still greater distance \*.

THOSE persons who recommend the experiment of negociation are bound to shew, that it is the way to attain that security and repose, without which peace would be merely nominal and delusive. But this is a task they do not even undertake. They avoid that investigation which alone could justify the adoption of so important a measure, and they avail themselves of

\* The Government of this Country has been censured for not being ready to treat with every Faction in France the moment its successful crimes gave it ascendancy.—Those who urge such censure do not hesitate to avow the principle, that whoever holds the reins of power (however obtained) is proper to be negociated with. If this pliant and accommodating policy had been adopted by Great Britain, she must lately have formed a great variety of engagements, from each of which she would have been speedily released by the downfall of the other high contracting party.

the palatable nature of the remedy they propose, instead of examining the manner of its operation, or the effect it is likely to produce. The idea of negociation is grateful and soothing to the generous mind—it suggests abstractedly a termination of differences, and an establishment of harmony ;—but as it is a *relative* idea, it should, in its application to a particular case, be examined by *relative* and not by *abstract* qualities. It is *then* the part of wisdom and prudence to enquire with whom it is proposed to negotiate ; whether they possess the essential requisites for negociation ; whether the objects of negociation be attainable, or (if attainable) desirable with regard to them ; and what, under all subsisting and probable circumstances, are likely to be the effects of an attempt to negotiate ? Judging in this manner of the question of negociation at the present moment, can it be said, that those persons, with whom alone it is possible to negotiate, possess any of the essential requisites for such an intercourse ? Have they either stability to ensure, ability to perform, or sincerity to attract confidence ? It is notorious to the whole world, that in all these particulars they are totally deficient. They are entirely destitute of all those qualities, moral and political, which must exist in order to render the objects of negociation *attainable* with any degree of rational certainty. Supposing even  
that

that they were capable of giving permanence to their engagements, it requires a degree of political apathy, amounting almost to depravity, to say, that an *adjustment of differences and an establishment of harmony* are *desirable* with respect to such persons. It is admitted that independent States have no jurisdiction over each other in respect of the moral character of those who may happen to hold the reins of power. But it would be a mournful day for humanity, which should witness a general recognition of the authority of a set of usurpers, who are not only, like all usurpers, stained with guilt and crimes, but who have formally adopted vice, cruelty, impiety, and perfidy, as their political system; who have disclaimed every sanction which civilized nations have agreed to respect; who have renounced every tie and restraint essential to good order, and indeed to the existence of society; and who have publicly abjured the most important of all relations, that between man and his Maker—between time and eternity. To seek pacification with such a Power would be to court, nay to embrace destruction. Besides, can it be expedient in a political sense for the Monarchs of Europe to treat with those whose aim it is to extirpate Monarchy \* ?

B. 2

Shall

\* The Monarchs engaged in the War certainly should not forget that (besides the many menaces which have been thrown out

Shall the Powers who fight to maintain the faith of Treaties and to enforce the laws of Nations treat with those who deride the authority of both? These sanguinary usurpers are fully and justly sensible that there is no safety for them but in the destruction of all regular and established Governments; they have therefore vowed to accomplish that destruction. And surely those Governments ought, on their part, to be alike sensible that there can be no security for them, nor of course for their States, until their implacable and inveterate foe be demolished.

To counterbalance all these disqualifications in the parties with whom it is proposed to negotiate, we are told, that they have possessed themselves of the supreme power of their Country—that we, being sensible of their power to make war, should acknowledge their power to make

out against them (throughout the Revolution) the National Convention, on the 25th of August 1792, did actually pass a decree to raise a body of 1200 assassins, to be named *Tyrannicides*, who were to be bound by an oath to destroy the Monarchs and Generals at war with France. This horrid plan was actually decreed, but was afterwards referred to a Committee, on a suggestion that it might occasion reprisals. The same spirit dictated the reply of the President of the Convention, on the 13th Feb. 1794, to an Address of the forty-eight Sections of Paris, when he said, “ This is a War to last till death between Republicans  
“ and Kings.”

peace

peace—that the Duke of Brunswick, General Wurmser, Lord Hood, having felt their power, and the Prince de Cobourg being likely to feel it, our Government ought to be ready to recognize it by Treaty. But without any reference to the means by which that power was obtained, we need only advert to the manner in which it is employed, and to the principles which it seeks to inculcate by fire and sword, to be convinced, that while it exists there can be no security for the power, independence, or quiet, of any other country. It is, indeed, a curious mode of reasoning to contend, that because a Power is able to molest and annoy, it is therefore deserving of trust and confidence—that because it has shewn itself malignant and mischievous, it is capable of becoming benign and beneficent.—Surely there are Powers with which no terms can be made, which are in their nature at constant variance with peace and security, and which can only be prevented from producing destruction by being destroyed themselves. The more formidable such Powers are, the greater vigilance and exertion are necessary to crush them. It is dangerous to encounter the power of the rapacious tyger and blood-thirsty wolf; but whosoever should endeavour to cultivate their friendship instead of resisting their fury, would pay dearly for his conciliatory disposition.

It is further contended, in favour of the experiment of negociation, that though it should fail, it would still be attended with the advantage of demonstrating that the war is altogether necessary, unavoidable, and defensive ; and that it would even tend to diminish the enthusiasm of the People in France, by shewing them, that they are engaged in a war not of defence but of conquest. It is somewhat remarkable, that the same persons who urge this reasoning declare, almost in the same breath, that whether the original aggression proceeded from us or the French, has ceased to be a question of importance, and that the origin of the war is become only a secondary consideration. But in order to ascertain the real nature and principle of the War, is it not abundantly more safe and easy to remount to its origin and causes, than to resort to the doubtful and precarious experiment of negociation ? They who, after considering the insulting and aggressive conduct of France—her declared intentions of subverting every Government in Europe—her direct communication with disaffected English subjects for the subversion of our own Government and Constitution—her renunciation of the authority of the laws of Nations—her wanton attack upon the Ally to whom we were bound by the most solemn Treaties, and on whose security depended our own—and, finally, her hostile and perfidious attack

attack upon ourselves, because she could not either bully or deceive us into an acquiescence in such a conduct—they who want *further* demonstration that the war is necessary, unavoidable, and defensive, are of so sceptical a disposition as leaves no chance of bringing conviction to their minds, either by negotiation or any other means.—They who are not completely satisfied by a review of the above circumstances would “ not “ be persuaded though one rose from the dead.” The discernment of such persons would probably come in aid of their incredulity, and assist them to discover, that a failure of negotiation was owing to the manner in which it was conducted, to the haughtiness by which it was accompanied, and some might find out that *it was never meant to succeed*.

BUT in the vain and fruitless attempt to convince some minds, there is danger that others, which are now firm in their belief and ardent in their zeal, might be shaken. The original grounds of the war do not require to be strengthened—they cannot be changed to advantage—and nothing can conduce more to a general and animated support of the war than to keep them in constant view. But an attempt to negotiate would have the appearance of abandoning those grounds; and the very persons who propose negotiation would be the first to give it such a construction. The reasoning by which they support

support that proposal proves that they would be ready to say, " You sought further proof that  
 " the war was defensive and unavoidable, and  
 " thereby you admitted that such proof was  
 " before deficient."

AN attempt to negotiate would also involve a dereliction of the principle of the war, from which we have declared it impossible ever to depart, and would put it out of our power, with consistency, to resume that principle. It would imply, that the object of the war is not considered to be indispensable. That object certainly is not *yet* attained; and the successes of the war, however important, can only be considered as steps towards its attainment. Those successes have indeed repelled immediate danger (an object certainly of the first consequence), but they must be followed up in order to provide for future security, on which the value of the advantages already acquired entirely depends. But no successes, in a war like the present, can warrant us to expect the attainment of such an object by way of negotiation, while the persons with whom we contend retain their ascendancy in France. For it is demonstrable that the system adopted by those persons must be at constant war with our security and that of the rest of Europe; and it would be the merest farce to ask them to concede what is necessary to such security; it would be  
 to.

to ask what they could not in reason be expected to grant ;—for our mutual objects are respectively as indispensable in themselves, as they are incompatible with each other. If the difference between us and France were merely a question of honour, arising out of the insults and provocations we have received, what would become of our dignity, if after being forced into a War, because we would not submit to those insults and provocations, we were to seek satisfaction otherwise than at the point of the sword, and, with our wrongs still unredressed, to tender the olive branch to our perfidious foe ?—And surely the policy of suing for peace is not heightened by the circumstance that our security is *immediately* and *distinctly* concerned, independently of its inseparable connection with our honour. The offer of negotiation, abject and humiliating as it would be with respect to ourselves, would also tend to inspire our Allies with a distrust both in our exertions and our professions. They would naturally suspect that, instead of being determined on a vigorous prosecution of the War, we were seeking for an opportunity of receding from the contest ; and thus that mutual confidence, which is the soul of co-operation, would be dissolved.

THE idea that a proposal to negotiate would  
*abate the enthusiasm of the French people for the War,*

*by convincing them that it would, if afterwards persisted in, be on their part a War not of defence but of conquest*, could scarcely be meant to be serious. Such an observation could only be intended to relieve the gravity of serious discussion, by surprising the mind with a striking assemblage of images, which it required a wonderful talent to associate in one point of view. But certainly we could not better assist the rulers of France, in keeping up whatever enthusiasm prevails among the French people in favour of the war, than by an offer of accommodation.—And those rulers would be destitute of their usual ability, if they neglected such an opportunity of inspiring the partizans of their infamous system with additional confidence and fury, and of filling the minds of their opponents with dismay. The motive of defence would be a weak stimulative to anarchical enthusiasm, compared to the prospect of universal conquest and boundless destruction. \*

BUT

\* The probable effect of a proposal to negotiate is not now left to conjecture ; for although we have not disgraced ourselves by making such an offer, the case has actually occurred in the frenetic imaginations of the Convention, and the manner in which the wild supposition was treated leaves no room to doubt of the impression which the reality would produce. Barrere in the month of Feb. 1794, in the name of the Committee of Public Welfare announced to the Convention that the Confederate Powers had sued for peace. In the course of his furious rhodomontade discourse on this occasion, are found the following choice passages : “ You desire peace—the leagued Kings do the  
“ same,

BUT some of the opponents of the War take another ground, and, affecting the utmost detestation of the monsters who tyrannize over France, disclaim all idea of alliance, accommodation, or even communication, with such wretches. They content themselves with proposing to *abandon* the War, to withdraw our forces, to remain on the defensive, and to leave France to herself. Such a proposal, if addressed singly to Great Britain, involves a greater insult on common sense, and a grosser violation of sound policy, than even that of negociation. Shall we calmly look on, as indifferent spectators, while a Power which is acknowledged to be unfit for alliance or amity with any civilized State, is establishing and extending its dominion, and acquiring a degree of strength which we may hereafter find irresistible? To do this in any case would be egregious folly: but to do it after the experience we have had of the evils inseparable from the existence of such a Power, would be a degree of folly for which it

“ same, but mark at what price ! A Diplomatic Agent in a  
 “ Neutral State said the other day, *The Confederate Powers are*  
 “ *willing provisionally to acknowledge the French Republic* (burst  
 “ of laughter). Well, *let us provisionally destroy all tyrannical*  
 “ *Governments*”(applauses).—And again: “ The Tyrants offer  
 “ you peace because they have neither money nor soldiers.”  
 —And again: “ IF THE BRITISH PEOPLE WISH FOR PEACE,  
 “ WHY DO THEY NOT DETACH THEMSELVES FROM THEIR  
 “ INFERNAL GOVERNMENT ?”—Finally, “ Arms and Gun-  
 “ powder must alone procure peace.”

would be impossible to find an adequate name. Nor could this Country inflict a deeper wound on her honour, nor more effectually sacrifice that reputation for good faith, and punctual adherence to her engagements, by which she is so eminently distinguished, than by abandoning the connection which she has formed with so many States for their common security. Could she after such a conduct hope for assistance in a moment of distress, even if any State should continue able to assist her? or, Could she expect, as heretofore, to supply the want of external assistance by the aid of internal fortitude and energy, when each of her legitimate sons would blush at the name of Briton? We have witnessed indeed the shocking spectacle of a people becoming alike dreadful and detestable, by the debasement of character, and the extinction of moral sentiment;—but the natives of this renowned Isle, invincible as they have often proved themselves, would lose their spirit with their dignity—and hide their blushing faces, if they could not look elate with conscious rectitude and unsullied honour. It is therefore to be hoped that no Englishman can insult his country so far as to propose that we should desert the War, and, relying on that Element which has been so often the scene of our glory to protect us in our disgrace, that we should, in defiance of our engagements, leave France and our Allies to their respective fates. The proposal of discontinuing  
the

the War, without the disgraceful recognition of Jacobin authority, must therefore be meant to refer to the *combined Powers* collectively. But were they to adopt the project of leaving *France* alone, could they indulge the hope that France would leave *them* alone?—What but War have they to oppose to her fraternizing incursions? If with the advantage of union and concert they find it so difficult to obtain a barrier against those incursions, how could they protect their respective States when their force should be divided \*? What could they expect but to be over-run one after another by the combined efforts of the French principles and French arms, invigorated by success, and assisted by the *congenial spirits* of their own dominions? In vain would they attempt to

\* The necessity and probable success of this union require no other evidence than the uneasiness it gives to those who favour the French cause. In vain do such persons pretend to be “Calm Observers.” Their minds are apparently far otherwise than “calm,” when they observe the “Concert of Princes” to preserve the existence of Society, and the independence of States. If those Princes were to dissolve the connection which a sense of common danger has compelled them to form, they would touch upon the fate of a late unfortunate Prince, who had not the advantage of the *timely* warning which has been given to *them*. Whatever animosities may have heretofore existed among them, the common interest of all is become the distinct interest of each; and the attempt to remind them, at a juncture like the present, of their ancient or their natural grounds of jealousy, can only be compared to an endeavour to revive the petty differences of neighbours, when engaged in extinguishing the flames that menace their houses with instant destruction.

form

form another coalition. The union \* which reigns among them being once broken, would probably be broken for ever.—Or if they should find it possible to rally, they could not expect to regain the position in which they now stand. They would lose the fruit of all their past exertions; and with their confidence, energy, and means of success diminished, in proportion as those of the enemy would be increased, they would have to begin their already arduous task over again: while France would speedily have replenished her granaries and magazines, and have collected stores of provisions and ammunition, which would embolden her to defy the utmost calculation of untoward events.

To render the insidious proposal of abandoning the War more feasible, it is urged, that the overthrow of the Jacobin system in France would be certain, if the Nation were left to itself, and relieved from the pressure of invasion. But rash indeed would be the Statesman who should desist from endeavouring to accelerate the destruction of this baneful system, in the confidence that it would *quietly* expire of itself. It certainly is not calculated for duration: But what mischief may it not accomplish before the period of its natural dissolution shall arrive? It is not even pretended, that while it continues there is any ground to expect that its  
nature

nature will change. The very hypothesis now combated supposes its termination to be necessary for the tranquility of mankind. The Jacobin disturbers of that tranquility are not very likely to be metamorphosed into peaceable and unoffending neighbours. They are to this moment as rancorous and as meddling as ever.\* The nature of Anarchy is indeed immutable. It can never cease, while it exists, to be restless, turbulent, and en-

\* On the 27th of January 1794, the President of the Convention, in reply to the application of some Americans in Paris for the liberation of Thomas Paine, observed, that “the Americans, like the French, had broken the yoke of despotism, sworn the downfall of Kings, and vowed eternal hatred to Tyrants and their slaves.” The Americans however have done none of these things; the honour which was so generously divided, belonged wholly to French Revolutionists.

In the sitting of Jan. 28, 1794, it was carried that the Bailiwick of Germerheim (where the French troops had just penetrated) should be “organized into Municipalities, and joined to the district of Landau.”

It would be injustice to the *Jacobins* not to detail also the following passages, which occurred at their sitting Jan. 20, 1794, when *Cambon* said, “Let us judge with impartiality the principles on which the British Government rests. I see a King! Good God, a King! What a monster in nature! A King who by the very Statutes is entrusted with such a plenitude of power as must devour, and indeed does devour, all the little powers which Popular Credulity flatters itself still to be invested with.”

In the same sitting *Couthon* moved that the Jacobins should celebrate the memorable epoch of the death of the Tyrant, by unanimously and solemnly repeating their oaths, *that they would destroy all Tyrants.*—This oath was immediately taken.

encroaching. Its neighbourhood is contagious, its atmosphere pestilential, its fraternity destructive.

BUT the supposition that the actual pressure of foreign invasion is necessary for the maintenance of such a system, is contradicted both by reason and experience. We have had abundant proof that it can be nourished as effectually by a spirit of aggression, ambition, vengeance, and proselytism, as by the more domestic impulse of national defence. We have seen that, when relieved from the pressure of invasion, the principle of that system is of a wonderful expansive nature. We have seen, that it is capable of spreading with irresistible velocity from State to State, and that, under the specious pretence of bestowing Universal Liberty, it is susceptible of the bold project of converting every Country under heaven into a French Department. We have also seen, that far from being weakened by expansion, it becomes, like all *contagious* systems, more formidable and destructive

taken. Several motions were afterwards made concerning the means of executing this purpose, of which the following were a part : “ That all Kings are to be beheaded in effigy ; and on  
 “ every Theatre shall be presented the *last Judgment of Kings*  
 “ (one of the favourite Republican dramas). It was also re-  
 “ solved to congratulate *The Mountain* on account of the  
 “ energy displayed in the trial of the Tyrant, and to order a *feu*  
 “ *de joye* to be fired the very hour when the Tyrant died.”

every

every step it advances, “ *viresque acquirit eundo.*” If the scheme therefore of invading France were relinquished, it must speedily be resumed, as the only effectual means of preserving other Countries from invasion ; and thus the case would speedily recur which is admitted to be favourable to Jacobinism. One event only could prevent such a recurrence—the entire reduction of all force adequate to repel that of France.

It has been already observed, that War is necessary to the continuance of the system which has justly excited universal alarm ; for War alone can afford occasion for that joint influence of terror and mad enthusiasm which is necessary to hold so discordant a mass together. But this consideration, far from warranting the conclusion which is deduced from it, affords perhaps the strongest reason that can be assigned for the vigorous pursuit of the War, until its ultimate object be completely and securely attained. For if the system of our opponents cannot exist but by the aid of War, it follows of course that they would be under the necessity of continuing hostilities for the preservation of that system. This they would find as easy as it is necessary, since they command the force and the passions of their Country. The fallacy of the contrary supposition consists in confounding offensive with defensive War, and

in concluding that the Powers of Europe could avoid the necessity of the one with the same facility as they can form the rash resolution to abandon the other ; as if they were in possession of some magical spell to restrain the Furies of France, when unchained by the retreat of the armies which now keep them in check, and impatient to revenge the hardships they had been made to suffer from traversing their frontier in order to carry their Liberty, Equality, and desolating Fraternity to other regions. In a contest like the present, the sword is the only shield. There is no other alternative for the Combined Powers than *offensive* or *defensive* War. Assaulted in the first instance themselves, they were obliged, for the preservation of their States, to convert defence into attack. If they had not done so, they would in all probability by this time have had no States to defend. But the transition may not be again possible ; and it only remains for them to persevere in the attack with a degree of vigour proportioned to the importance of its object, until they may securely exchange the sword for the plough-share ; and in the solid establishment of *genuine* peace find a solace and a remedy for the miseries of war.

In pursuit of the insidious attempt to excite a dissatisfaction with the War, and to render it unpopular, nothing which is capable of perversion  
and

and misapplication is suffered to escape notice. The distresses and dangers which are inseparable from a state of War are painted in the most glowing colours:—the ever-lively apprehensions of the Merchant and the Manufacturer are pathetically addressed, and the most alarming scenes are displayed to their susceptible minds. Besides the inconveniences which may fairly be ascribed to the War, it is also charged with embarrassments produced by other causes. Incredible pains are taken to make it appear responsible for every misfortune which occurs, and the melancholy list of Bankruptcies with which for some time our Gazettes were clouded, is without hesitation placed to that account. But the recovery of credit *flagrante bello* affords the best answer to such insinuations. The Gazettes, which happily no longer afford even this apparent ground of triumph, vindicate the War from the aspersions, and demonstrate that the late commercial failures arose from a different source \*.

D 2

OF

\* It is a pleasing circumstance to be able to ascertain that the late unparalleled distress of the Commercial and Manufacturing World, instead of being occasioned by the War, may be traced with certainty to the rapid progress and wonderful extent of the prosperity of the country. The War, far from having drained our resources, was but just begun. No visible stagnation had taken place in trade or manufactures until the very moment they received the sudden shock. The operation of war would  
have

OF all classes of persons, the Commercial has the least reason to indulge restlessness and impatience

have been gradual, and thereby have furnished opportunities to counteract or evade the mischief. The sudden transition of the Country from alarm and distress to wealth, confidence, and prosperity, had encouraged individuals to seize, if not with too much avidity, at least with too little precaution, the golden occasion. Trade was pushed to the utmost extent. The boldness of speculation and adventure knew no bounds. All this, however, would have been warranted by the state of the Country, if adequate and secure channels had been provided for that circulating medium, which (like the blood of the animal frame) must incessantly feed and support the operations of commerce. But instead thereof the channels that were opened and depended upon for this important purpose were remarkably precarious, unstable, and unfit to resist any extraordinary pressure. The manufacturer boldly laid out his returns in new capital, in raw materials, in buildings and machinery, while he depended on the assistance of paper currency to answer both constant demands and occasional exigencies. That paper currency (which was issued to such an extent as almost to make both specie and Bank of England security disappear, in many parts of the country) was destitute of any solid foundation. The persons who issued it were in general far from being qualified by their capitals to do so. They set up Country Banks for the purpose of speculating; and they distributed their paper to the utmost possible extent upon the security of mortgages, of various speculations, and even of *those very manufactures*, which depended for their support on the stability of such paper. The supply of ready cash kept within reach, was barely sufficient for common occasions, and the funds which should have been ready to answer a sudden or an unusual call were either not in existence or not within reach. Nothing can be more evident than that the fabric which rested on such a basis must, sooner or later, fall to the ground. The fictitious credit which was its support must,

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patience under the War ; for although that class may sustain a larger share than any other of the temporary

in the ordinary course of events, be put to the test, and the weight of the mass, every day encreasing, must at length, of itself, make so weak a foundation give way. It has not been proved that the War accelerated the catastrophe, which in itself was unavoidable. If it did, it was so far serviceable, by rendering that catastrophe less shocking and disastrous than it must have been if longer delayed. A few failures (unconnected with the War) happened, in effect, to prove the Touchstone of that artificial credit, with which so large a portion of our Trade and Manufactures was inseparably interwoven. The effect was almost instantaneous. Distrust, thus excited, and meeting with such solid grounds, spread with inconceivable velocity to every part of the Commercial system. Bankruptcies so numerous, so extensive, so contrary to all expectation, took place, that no one knew in whom to confide. Numbers were involved in the disaster, who, far from being implicated in the cause, were men of undeniable property and unimpeachable credit, but who could not at the moment avail themselves of those advantages. Every day brought fresh misfortunes, and in the total failure of confidence the possible extent of the evil defied all conjecture. The Bank finding the mischief beyond its ability to remedy, was, in prudence, obliged to withhold an ineffectual relief. At the critical moment Government seasonably and effectually interposed. The Minister suggested a measure, which received the sanction of Parliament, for the support of sinking Credit. Five millions of Exchequer Bills were issued for that purpose, and Commissioners were appointed (without a salary) to deliver them on good security to Traders who wanted such assistance. The measure has met a success equal to the most benevolent wish, and beyond the most sanguine expectation. About two millions of the Exchequer Bills have been found sufficient to answer the purpose, and persons of solid property, enabled thereby to sustain the pressure of the moment, have had time to avail themselves of their

temporary inconvenience inseparable from a state of War, it is beyond all comparison the most benefited by the *present* security which the War has produced; and it will derive the most extensive advantage, from that *permanent* security which it is the object of the War to establish. Of all the branches of the social system, the Commercial is by far the most sensitive—that which is the soonest affected by a disturbed atmosphere, and which flourishes with the greatest luxuriance under the benign influence of a serene and settled sky. They who are fond of tracing a picture of suffering Commerce, and who in their zeal to make the War appear odious, overcharge that picture greatly beyond the reality, are extremely cautious to conceal another picture which, by furnishing a striking contrast, would make an excellent companion to their own: I mean a picture of the state in which Commerce would probably have been at this time, if it had not been protected by the War from the desolating incursions of the new Republic. Such a picture

their actual resources. Confidence has thus, during the progress of the War, been restored to the Commercial World; Credit has passed the furnace, and has been purified — The sound part of the system has been preserved; the strength of the *stamina* ascertained to be immense; and notwithstanding the effect of such a convulsion, unprecedented in the annals of Trade, the Revenue has during the first year of a War, equalled the average of the four last years of Peace!

wants no assistance from imagination ; it may be seen in a retrospect of the deplorable situation of some of the most Commercial towns of Germany, and of the Provinces of the Austrian Netherlands, before the efforts of the War, by rescuing those towns and provinces, snatched the rest of Europe from the impending ravages of French fraternity. But without referring to scenes which happily exist no more, the actual condition of France displays a faithful representation of the effects of anarchy upon the commercial, as well as all the other interests of a country. Let the British Merchant consider what he now is, even during the War, and then let him turn his eyes to France, and to those States which remain subjected to her barbarous yoke, and there see what he might have been, if the baneful and encroaching system of Jacobinism had not been checked—what he may still be, if that system be not exterminated. Let the Manufacturer consider seriously, whether it be not better that *some* of his looms should afford, for a time, a quiet receptacle for the spider, than that they should *all* be at the mercy of a furious rabble, spreading desolation in support of the cause of Liberty and Equality ? We are told of the thousands of artisans, who, for want of other employ, are glad to engage in military service. But as a great proportion (at least) of these valuable hands would have been interrupted in their occupation by circumstances

cumstances independent of the War (as has been already noticed), the War is so far of advantage, as it furnishes them with an honourable resource: and since they are prevented for a time from throwing the shuttle, they cannot surely be better employed than in wielding the sword, in defence of that property and that security on the preservation of which they depend for the future renewal of their useful labours. Indeed if all the hardships and inconveniences ascribed to the War had been produced thereby in the full extent of party exaggeration, they would be supported with the utmost cheerfulness by all who should view them in competition with the dangers which the War has already repelled, and the mischiefs which it endeavours to avert. But what a bright and captivating prospect will open upon us when, by the dint of patient, vigorous, and unremitting exertions, we shall have ensured the important and indispensable object of the War? a prospect in which the Trading Interest will appear with distinguished lustre. Brilliant beyond all experience will then be the situation of this Country: secure of all the benefits which its incomparable Constitution, its natural and acquired advantages, and its increased weight in the political balance can bestow; the emporium of Commerce—the Arbiter of Europe—the object of universal respect and confidence—the pride of nations—

nations—the tutelary Guardian of Society—then will the sun of Britain's glory shine forth with meridian splendour. Nor will it constitute a feeble ray of that glory to have been instrumental in restoring to a neighbouring, and, for ages, a rival Country, the blessings of order and legitimate government; and in delivering its surviving millions from the fangs of anarchy. The only way to this summit of prosperity lies through the rugged path of War, which, however arduous, we must with patience and resolution continue to pursue, or by abandoning it we must fall into that dreadful abyss, which elsewhere surrounds us on every side.

SUCH are the advantages obtained by the past exertions—such the prospects awaiting the future success of a War, which some endeavour to represent as productive of misery, and as pregnant with ruin. If to avoid a War which has produced, and which promises so much, we had submitted to the insults of France, and declined to contribute our exertions toward checking its furious career, there is no room to doubt that our Allies would have been long since overwhelmed—the greatest part of Europe over-run—its Balance entirely destroyed—its Governments overthrown—and its States broken up and converted into French Depart-

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ments.

ments. These events are neither suggested by timidity, nor feigned by imagination.—Realized in some measure before we were engaged in hostilities, their completion was advancing with hasty strides, and seemed to presage a destruction, which could never have been effected by French arms, if they had not been dipped in the subtle poison of French principles. Let the opponents of the War point out by what means we should have escaped the general wreck. Let them tell us how we should have been preserved amidst surrounding ruin. They avow indeed an attachment to the British Constitution: they would not have scrupled, however, to expose this valuable object of their *regard* and *admiration* to the above perils. Happily its preservation was not entrusted to them. Such friendship as theirs would furnish but a precarious dependence in a moment of danger :

*Non tali auxilio—nec defensoribus istis  
Tempus eget ———*

To prevent, however, a catastrophe which would have excluded every ray of hope and every ground of consolation, we have not been allowed an opportunity to claim even the negative merit of resorting to hostilities. For notwithstanding all the censure which is cast upon the War, it is a fact of unquestionable notoriety, that the impatient fury of  
French

French Demagogues did not allow us the option of peace, but eager to involve us, as well as the rest of Europe, in like confusion with their own country, actually commenced the War by an act of the grossest perfidy ; a circumstance of which their advocates are remarkably forgetful.

It is indeed curious to observe how very partial and scanty a survey is taken of the War, by those who seek to make it a source of popular discontent. They see nothing of its numerous and aggravated provocations — of the insults and dangers which preceded it — of the inevitability which marked its eruption — of the advantages which accompany its progress — nor of the important and indispensable objects which depend upon its final success. All these things entirely escape their notice : they can only discover its perils, its difficulties, its scenes of calamity and distress. Should a check or disaster occur, their grief is clamorous, and their indignation knows no bounds. In the vehemence of their concern they magnify the misfortune vastly beyond its real extent and its probable consequences. — They make no allowance for accident or difficulty. They find it sufficient matter for blame that casualties were not prevented, that impossibilities were not performed, that the elements were not compelled to

lend their ready assistance. Nay so violently are they affected, that although the very next day the misfortune should be not only remedied, but also skilfully improved to advantage, they cannot so soon recover their wonted serenity. Some, indeed, want the decency even to assume a mask of sorrow on such occasions, and are so dead to all sense of shame as well as of patriotism, as openly to exult and triumph in the misfortunes of their country.

ALAS ! we know already, without their assistance, that War is unavoidably attended with much danger, difficulty, and inconvenience ; that it is a nauseous as well as a violent remedy : but it is a remedy which is become necessary for our own preservation, as well as for the restoration of general security against the enemies of order, morality, religion, society, and humanity. Whoever attempts to oppose the pursuit, or to impede the success of such a War, is in effect a confederate with the monsters against whom it is carried on.

BUT he must entertain a very contemptible and injurious opinion of the people of this country who supposes that any artifice, misrepresentation, or sophistry, can abate their ardour in a struggle, upon the success of which the preservation of  
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every thing dear to them depends. We know the value of the interests we have at stake, and shall grudge neither exertion nor expence to secure them :—We shall neither repine at our burthens, should they be necessarily augmented, nor despond upon those occasional disasters to which a state of hostilities is exposed. Our gracious Sovereign does not hesitate to expose the lives of his sons in the cause of his people ; while these illustrious princes, with a courage truly heroical, face the greatest dangers, and in defending the cause, add to the laurels of their Country. Who shall be insensible of the influence of so bright an example ? Where shall be found the Englishman so degenerate as to be backward to assist, with chearful patriotism, in his person or in his substance, the same glorious cause ? Every class—every rank is deeply interested ; for it is the welfare of all which has been endangered, and which is to be secured \*. The Merchant, the  
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\* The French Revolution began by attacking the Monarch, the Nobles, and the Clergy ; and those necessary ranks were called upon throughout Europe to view the example with jealousy and alarm. But the danger was by no means peculiar to them. When the rights of the higher orders are made the sport of popular fury and outrage, the security of other classes has but a precarious and short-lived existence. The progress of the Revolution completely verifies this remark. We now see property of every species, public and  
private,

Manufacturer, the Peasant, and the Peer—all persons of every description are concerned to support, to the utmost of their power, a contest with the common enemy of mankind. But if any one individual among his Majesty's subjects is more interested than the rest in restoring and securing the blessings of peace to this Country, it is the man who by his talents and exertions has raised it from distress to prosperity. It cannot but excite general satisfaction and confidence to see the helm of State continued, at a juncture like

private, pillaged with as little ceremony as that of the Church and the Nobility, at first. The principle of universal plunder, which was then only in embryo, is now arrived at full maturity, and publicly avowed, without a blush, in the Convention—where Danton has declared that the people must be excited to vengeance against the Rich—where the same blood-thirsty demagogue has denounced the “Aristocracy of Trade” as a proper subject of depredation; and one of his infamous colleagues has avowed it to be necessary “to convince the *Merchants* that France could do without them.” Public bodies are not more secure than individuals, and the property of the East India Company and of the *Caisse d'Escompte* is confiscated upon the most absurd pretences.—Nay even agricultural property is invaded like the rest; the whole produce of a harvest is decreed to belong to the Nation—that is, to those who tyrannize over the Nation; and Robespierre, another Conventional Monster, has declared that the rich farmers must be delivered up to the people. While such a system continues to prevail in any country, every trader, farmer, and proprietor, in other countries, ought to tremble. To all who wish the War to be abandoned before such a system is exterminated, it may be said with peculiar propriety, “*de te fabula narratur.*”

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the present, in hands where the Royal discernment so judiciously and advantageously placed it upwards of eight years ago. Who can feel so great an interest to preserve, as HE who has contributed so much to restore? Where else can the just possession of well-earned fame, and of public favour and gratitude, afford an equal security for the best possible application of the national resources in support of the national honour and interests? And while the public need not fear that so able and thrifty a steward should become improvident, lavish, and prodigal, they will not wish him, by a narrow, ill-timed, and ruinous parsimony, to put it out of his power to perpetuate the benefits of his administration.

THE same persons who condemn the War in general do not fail to censure it in the detail: in *their* eyes, whatever is done or projected—every plan, every operation is sure to be wrong.—If we have a fleet in the Mediterranean, it ought to be in the Channel;—and if in the Channel, protecting the trade and the vitals of the Country, it should be engaged somewhere else. If we employ and expose our own troops, we are wasteful of British blood;—and if we subsidize foreign troops, we are lavish of British treasure upon hirelings and mercenaries. Such censures, however, will have but little effect, unless they can be accompanied with the charge  
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that the War is carried on with languor and supineness. While its character is spirit and activity, vain will be all attempts to draw off the public attention from its general conduct and effect to partial, inadequate, and mutilated details. A discerning Public will not be prevented by any artifice from seeing and appreciating those exertions, both naval and military, which exceed not only all expectation, but also all precedent in any one year of any War; exertions which have displayed themselves in the rapid extension of our marine—in the uncontested dominion of the British Flag—in the effectual protection of our own commerce, and the total destruction of that of the enemy—in the acquisitions already made in both the Indies, and the ability we have acquired to push those acquisitions to any extent we please—in the permanent and invaluable advantage of having destroyed one third of the navy, together with the grand arsenal—not merely of our present adversary, but of our natural rival—in the appropriation of the whole of the Newfoundland fishery, of the Levant and the Italian trades—and in the powerful extensive and well-cemented confederacy we have been instrumental in forming among the principal Powers of Europe, to defend the common interests of all States, the independence of Nations, the authority of Treaties, and the existence of Civilized Society.

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THE dissingenuous reasoners above alluded to ask with great seriousness, whether the war is to be a war of extermination ; and they urge that the united force of a country like France, possessing such immense resources, and struggling for its liberties, presents a degree of resistance that must baffle all the exertions of the Combined Powers. The war is certainly a war of extermination ; but not in the sense its opponents would have us affix to the word : Not a war for the extermination of a people or of their liberties : Not for the extermination of national prosperity or of social happiness : its object is to root out a tremendous evil, which oppresses and ruins a populous and extensive Territory, and which menaces the whole human race with destruction : to destroy a system of licentiousness, disorganization, and universal hostility : to stifle the turbulent spirit, and to crush the usurped and ferocious power by which that system is animated and sustained : these are the things which must be exterminated before Europe can obtain security or enjoy repose. The Anarchy of France is a desolating fire, which seeks to consume whatever is near it. That fire had begun to spread to the neighbouring edifices, and at one period menaced all Europe with a general conflagration. By dint of exertion its progress has happily been checked, and it has been driven back to the spot where it

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first

first broke out ; but what folly would it be to leave it before it is entirely got under ! The engines must play until this fire be extinguished, or the flames will again burst forth, and resume their dreadful ravages.

As to the union and resources which, it is pretended, present such obstacles to the success of the War, Where is that union ? What is the state of those resources ? What union is there in France but that of unprincipled wretches, who combine, without either attachment or mutual confidence, for the perpetration of crimes, and who destroy each other the moment their interests or views are divided ? The first Revolution dissolved all union and harmony, by setting at variance the various ranks in the State, and by removing all those ties and restraints which are necessary to connect men in Society. The subsequent Revolutions which have torn and distracted France, have been nothing else than the successive victories of contending factions, which have in their turn acquired predominance by force and violence ; and, as was to be expected, the most sanguinary of those factions has been ultimately triumphant : each of those Revolutions has brought with it,

“ ———— Ruin upon Ruin, Rout on Rout,  
“ Confusion worse confounded.” PAR. LOST.

It

It is argued, however, that the People, by their submission to such a Government (if a Government it can be called), shew themselves decided in its favour, and determined to support it. But does the violence which is employed to produce that submission prove it to be voluntary? Can there be a fairer criterion of the degree of resistance, than the degree of force used to suppress that resistance? The crowded prisons \*—the Revolutionary Tribunal †—the constant executions—the Guillotine permanent and ambulatory—are remarkable proofs of the attachment of the People to the Government. One Bastille has by some persons been considered as sufficient evidence that

\* The prisons in France are supposed to contain 200,000 wretched inhabitants. With respect to one, called *The Conciergerie*, at Paris, let us hear *Vouland*, who, in the name of the Committee of Safety, addressed the Convention as follows, on the 27th of January 1794.

“ You have decreed that the prisoners to be tried by the  
 “ Revolutionary Tribunal for Counter-Revolutionary projects  
 “ should be confined in the prison of *The Conciergerie*; but the  
 “ number of prisoners sent there from all parts of the Republic  
 “ is so great, that this prison will not hold them. THIS  
 “ PROVES THE MULTITUDE OF OUR ENEMIES.”

† By the ordinary returns of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Lyons for five days there appeared in that space to have been there executed as follows :

|                |       |
|----------------|-------|
| Guillotined,   | 325   |
| Shot to death, | 339   |
|                | <hr/> |
|                | 664   |

the ancient system was maintained by oppression and constraint—(although that prison did not, at its boasted demolition, contain even a single prisoner charged with crimes against the State): —but the Bastilles out of number which have succeeded, demonstrate *the perfection of Liberty, and the spontaneous acquiescence of the People*. Whole reigns of Monarchs passed away without one execution for Revolutionary attempts—so much was the Monarchy *detested*: but the copious streams of blood which now incessantly flow from the Altars of the Republic, denote the *preference* of the People for Republican Government. Those who reason in this way reckon for nothing that system of terror which reigns throughout France, and which pervades every recess of that miserable country. It is by this formidable engine that the merciless dominion which prevails has been gradually established, and is still upheld\*.

\* “ With one single word you might compose the greatest part of the history of three Assemblies. This word is—FEAR.

“ Fear sanctified the revision of the Constitution, and occasioned its being adopted.

“ Fear of Republicanism, in the time of the Legislative Assembly, ranged the Independents on the side of the Feuillants; and Fear has, in a great measure, produced all the variations in the Convention.

“ Fear does not always shew itself under the same character. Accordingly the Anarchists have the art to vary the form, in order the more effectually to excite it; and, through fear, to drag mankind along with them.”

BRISOT.

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Were it not for the sad evidence of fact, it would, in theory, appear impossible for terror to obtain such a sway over a populous, civilized, and enlightened nation. Nor could such a sway have been obtained without the aid of that veil of Patriotism, which has been used to disguise every measure of the Revolution, and which, thin and transparent as it is become, serves to this hour as a cover and pretext for the most shocking atrocities. The dominion of terror thus obtained is favoured and preserved by the extinction of every moral and religious principle, and of every sentiment of nature and humanity. That repugnance to the shedding of blood which nature has implanted in the human breast, is entirely overcome, and a thirst for blood is substituted in its place. The violation of duties hitherto esteemed the most sacred among men is considered as the most exalted of virtues—and whoever should betray a friend, a father, or a husband, to the furious Demons of Democracy, would be held up to admiration and applause. Hence universal distrust prevails, every man views his neighbour with suspicion or with apprehension, and no one dares to utter his groans, either for his country, his kindred, or himself. In such a state of things, the novel *phenomena* of arming the People in a mass, and of compelling that mass to march and to fight in support of a detested cause, are found  
not

not only practicable but easy. Those persons, therefore, who infer the approbation of the People from their neglecting the opportunity which “their being armed affords of righting themselves,” forget the situation of the Country, the nature of the governing Power, the means it employs, and the influence of Fear when once it has gained possession of the mind. For the People, even with arms in their hands, to right themselves under such a tyranny, would require resolution, concert, and opportunity, which cannot be expected to exist where confidence is entirely abolished, and where vigilance and alarm are without intermission. The blood-thirsty Rulers, with their numerous agents, are incessantly prying for victims with that Argus-eyed watchfulness which can only exist under Republican forms. They scrutinize every word and every look \*, and want no other evidence of guilt than suspicion ! They are most wastefully prodigal of the lives of men, and make it their maxim, that too much blood cannot be spilt either on the scaffold or in the field. Whenever their infamous cause meets with a disaster, they instantly wreak their vengeance on defenceless victims—they call off the attention of the people by a sudden burst of fury, and find their remedy or their

\* “ *Verba—vultus—in crimen detorquens.* ”

consolation in human sacrifices. They even celebrate their successes in the same manner, and crown with acts of cruelty and slaughter their civic festivities \*. Possessed of the public force, they convert it into an engine of severity and terror, and they perpetrate their cruelties with a formality which renders them still more shocking and atrocious †. They chiefly employ persons of the most desperate and abandoned character—the ready instruments of every crime; they have always at their command troops of armed banditti; and thus they hold peaceable and virtuous citizens in awe and subjection. They easily render the populace (whom, according to the invariable practice of Republicans, they de-

\* They have repeatedly amused themselves on these occasions with sinking a vessel laden with unfortunate victims of wanton barbarity.

† They have, however, on several occasions, laid aside all formality, finding it an impediment to the gratification of their insatiate fury. The Revolutionary Tribunal has been authorized to convict without the *dilatory* process of examining witnesses. The Guillotine itself has been found too tardy in its operations—and whole troops of destined victims have, with a barbarity of which there is no example, been exposed at once to the fire of grape-shot, which laid the mangled carcases of the wounded in one heap with their more fortunate brethren, who had been at once relieved from their miserable existence. Such are the wretches with whom it is proposed to make peace!

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nominate the People \*) subservient to their schemes, and the ready instruments of terror and destruction. In short, *these wretches* cement their dominion by blood, and confound and astonish by the enormity of their crimes and by the celerity of their massacres ! But although the instruments of death in constant exercise, the axe perpetually suspended, restrain the unfortunate people from throwing off their grievous yoke, the insurrections which have existed in almost every part of the Republic, suppressed by such means, furnish a decisive proof of the detestation in which the subsisting tyranny is held ; while the strenuous and persevering efforts of the Christian and Royal Army in Poitou and Brittany denote the general wish of the People to see restored—the Throne of their King and the Altars of their God !

\* The People, far from exercising that Sovereignty with the phantom of which they are flattered and cajoled, have infinitely less real influence than they possessed under their former Monarchy. With the name of Freedom in their mouths, and perpetually resounded in their ears, they are in a state of the vilest subjection and abasement. To keep up the farce of Republicanism, they are made to promote every measure projected by their Tyrants ; but to refuse, to oppose, or even to hesitate, would be attended with certain and immediate destruction. Constitution after Constitution is therefore readily accepted by them as soon as proposed. Nor is there any plan, however absurd or mischievous, of which their eager acceptance would not be announced by a *general discharge of artillery*.

SUCH

SUCH is the boasted Union which is to *resist* and *repel* the armies of almost all Europe. In judging of the resources which remain in aid of the same cause, care should be taken not to confound them with the efforts of the moment. Desolated by more than four years Revolution, France has scarcely any thing left of what constitutes the resources of a Country but her population—and that, diminished as it is, threatens to become her greatest incumbrance;—without either commerce, credit, or manufactures—making even her agriculture subordinate to the occupation of war—already pinched by scarcity, and menaced by the near and rapid approaches of inevitable famine—depending, both for subsistence and the means of War, on precarious supplies, clandestinely drawn, at an immense cost, from those Powers who, under colour of a disgraceful Neutrality, contribute to uphold her infernal cause, and who thereby nourish a viper which, if not crushed, will sting them in their turn—a Neutrality as ungenerous as it is impolitic; for those Powers which observe it owe their present safety and their future hopes to the War which the Belligerent Powers sustain against France. The Tyrants of this exhausted country are also reduced to the extremity, not only of appropriating by rapacity and plunder, the property of individuals wherever it can be found at home, but of devising unheard-of contrivances to draw within their spoliating grasp

that which has been deposited in other countries. This last resource, the plunder of private property, must speedily fail, as the only channels which can supply that property are dried up ; and nothing will then remain but a paper currency, originally founded upon injustice and robbery, indebted for its internal credit to the compulsory limitation of the price of every commodity, and discredited abroad to the lowest degree of nominal and fictitious value. Such is the condition of the Country to which it is proposed to sue for peace—a condition so distressing, as to amount almost to an adequate punishment for the crimes which have produced it, and to convey an idea of just retribution, were it not that the good sustain the greatest share of the calamity. The condition of human life in the most savage and barbarous tribes is truly enviable, when compared with that exhibited in France ; and those turbulent Characters who abuse the security and protection afforded by other States, would flee to the woods and deserts rather than trust themselves in that land of horror and desolation. In short, this once flourishing Kingdom exhibits only the wreck of Society ; and the impious Regicides who have usurped its dominion, have nothing left to defend themselves with but the ruins of the country which they have desolated.

BUT this statement by no means warrants us to despise the efforts which they are now making,  
and

and which possibly for a short time longer they may have it in their power to make. Those efforts afford a melancholy instance of the energy which the empire of terror, delusion, and crimes, can call forth, when its ruinous sway is once established over a powerful and populous Country. Those efforts bear, indeed, the genuine stamp of desperation ; they would themselves produce the ruin of France, even if she were in her pristine state of prosperity. But let Europe beware of their success, for then the ruin will be general. The monsters who direct them seem justly aware, that only a single struggle remains in behalf of their infamous cause, and they collect all their strength upon the occasion. To prolong their domination, fleeting as it is ferocious, they feel no regret in sacrificing the permanent interests of their Country, and in inflicting on it wounds from which it cannot recover for ages. Conscious that humanity must every where refuse impunity to deeds like theirs, they seem indifferent about their own fate, so that their destruction do not come alone ; and they endeavour (Sampson-like) to pull down the edifice of Society, although they expose themselves to be buried in its ruins. Hence those agonies of convulsive rage which justly excite our astonishment and alarm, and which should call forth the greatest exertion and vigilance ; for, unfortunately, to destroy is a much

easier task than to preserve, and infinitely more so than to restore. These impious demagogues, able and active as they are desperate and unprincipled, resort to means which no regular Government could employ. They make robbery, sacrilege, impiety, and murder, the instruments of their designs ; and they crush domestic opposition by measures which would overthrow any legitimate power upon earth. They arm the People in a mass, drive into the field all the youth of the Country (on whose labours depends the subsistence of another year), and stimulate them to fight, undisciplined as they are, like desperadoes, by the intoxicating fumes of liquor, and the still more intoxicating fumes of Anarchical Fanaticism ;—while, to counteract all remaining influence of fear, as well as of disaffection, the awful Guillotine, which first compelled them to march, stands behind, and points out a much greater danger than that of advancing against the enemy. Thus do they lead army after army to defeat and to slaughter—and thus, without a single victory, by dint of numbers and by incessant attacks, do they harass and fatigue the regular forces opposed to them ; which display, in the most useful manner, the advantage of discipline, by retiring in good order from the impetuous torrent, to situations where they may be able to check its course, until, spent in its own violence, it may subside.

SUCH efforts cannot last long, nor be often repeated. But to frustrate them demands, as it deserves, every possible degree of vigilance and exertion. The Powers who are combined in the cause of Society and Humanity should neglect nothing that can conduce to their success. Their resources, thank Heaven ! exceed beyond all comparison those of their adversary \* ; and if

\* Besides the natural disproportion between the strength and resources of France, and those of nearly the rest of Europe collectively—there cannot be a greater contrast than that which is exhibited between the condition of France and that of the Coalesced Powers. On the one hand, we see a population incredibly diminished by emigration, proscription, massacre, unremitting executions, and that barbarous kind of War in which the value of human life is estimated as nothing, and the want of discipline is compensated only by the numbers that are driven to slaughter ; a neglected agriculture—an enfeebled and diminished navy, that dares not shew itself out of port—a total failure of commerce and manufacture—and a want of every article which is necessary either for subsistence or for War, and which commerce alone can supply : while internally there is neither law, order, nor security ; and the state of uproar, confusion, and horror, equals the distress and alarm which such a situation cannot fail to produce. On the other hand, the Combined Powers, far from experiencing any sensible loss of population, sustain only the ordinary losses incident to War ; losses which are provided against by care, discipline, generalship, plentiful supplies of food and cloathing, and every humane attention to life and health. We see also the commerce of the States at war with France prosperous and flourishing, compensating the loss of their trade with that country, by participating her numerous branches of foreign commerce :—The marine of the Naval Powers in full vigour, and abundantly more than sufficient to protect their own trade, and prevent

they apply those resources with resolution and vigour, with promptitude and unanimity—their success may be considered as morally certain. Hitherto they have certainly erred in their calculation of the degree of resistance they should have to encounter. Nor is this strange: for they could not suppose it possible that a sufficient degree of severity could be put in practice, to restrain that internal opposition which so grievous a tyranny could not fail to produce. Hereafter, if they err, it behoves them to take especial care that it be on the safe side. For this purpose they should adopt it as a maxim, that every exertion in their power is indispensably necessary: and should they employ greater means than might possibly suffice for the attainment of their object, they will be amply rewarded by every moment that they thereby accelerate the return of tranquillity and security.

WE are sometimes told, that when the War shall be felt in its burdens, it will become unpopular, and that by exciting discontent, it may prove

prevent that of the enemy from reviving:—while at home, their States enjoy the substantial blessings of orderly and well-regulated Society, and all ranks display an unparalleled ardour to support a War, on the success of which depends the continuance of those blessings to the present generation, and the transmission of them to posterity.

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the source of confusion, and even endanger the safety of the Constitution itself. Such insinuations are far from being complimentary of the good sense and good dispositions of the Country. The British People have not only with cheerfulness, but with ardour, supported Wars undertaken in defence of the national honour, or of the general security of Europe; and they will scarcely shrink from a War which, besides having in view the above important considerations, has for its object the preservation of their Constitution, and of their existence as a free and independent nation. Every motive that has ever yet existed—every motive that insult, provocation, and aggression—or that a desire of vengeance or of defence can inspire, to stimulate to a vigorous and animated prosecution of a War, occurs with unexampled force on the present occasion. Nay, motives which have never before existed, even in idea, call loudly upon us to distinguish this from every former War by unprecedented vigour and exertion. It has for centuries been the native sentiment of British minds, that neither blood nor treasure should be spared to prevent the aggrandisement of the French Monarchy. And shall we now, for the first time, cringe to the power of France, tremble at her wrath, and yield to her spirit of conquest and domination, because she has assumed

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the name of a Republic—because she has renounced all sense of honour and humanity—because she is transformed from a polished to a barbarous nation, retaining the arts of civilization only to become more dreadfully savage, more extensively pernicious—and because she claims a right, by a profanation of the sacred name of Liberty, to excite insurrection in every other country, and to overturn every other Government? Never had we such grounds of hostility with a French Monarch—never was conquest so indispensable as it is now. The question before us is not, whether the British Flag shall maintain its honour, or the British Name its respect—whether we shall preserve our Commerce or our Colonies, nor even whether we shall continue to enjoy the mild and benign influence of our Laws, Religion, and inimitable form of Government ;—but, whether without any Laws, Religion, or Government, we shall become a prey to devouring anarchy, and experience the horrors of which France presents so dreadful a spectacle, and which she endeavours to render universal. Such a War may indeed be stiled a War *pro aris et focis*—a War for the defence, not merely of property, but of public worship, of domestic comforts, of useful labour, of the personal rights of the husbandman and mechanic—rights which infinitely surpass all property

perty in point of value, and which it is the greatest boast of our Constitution to guard inviolate. Shall we be told then that the burdens of such a War are likely to excite discontent and commotion? or, Can a greater libel be uttered against Englishmen than to insinuate, that they would hesitate to face any danger, to endure any burdens, or to display any degree of energy, in such a cause?

THE prediction, however, of numerous and intolerable burdens has happily been falsified. The day which was to produce so severe a trial of the patience and ability of the Country is over—and it has proved a day, not of gloom, embarrassment, or despondency, but of sunshine. It has displayed the flourishing state of our revenue, and the existence of ample resources for the prosecution of the War, without distressing the labouring part of the community. Such faculties have been displayed to meet the exigencies of the War, as even to prevent our patriotism from being put to the test. The plans which distinguished that day were indeed so satisfactory, that those whose *habit* it is to represent every measure of Administration in the most *unfavourable* light, found it necessary for their own credit to bestow their applause on the occasion. It is to be hoped that the persons whose minds were before alarmed at the phantom they had formed, are at length relieved from their apprehensions; if not, they may find a much more effectual way of

obviating the danger they apprehend, than by proclaiming it aloud in the streets and market-places. It would be abundantly more effectual for that purpose, were they seriously and steadily to employ themselves in cultivating a disposition for harmony and union, and a spirit of activity and exertion, in support of the War—in keeping up the persuasion of the necessity of its being pursued with vigour and alacrity—in strengthening the hands of Government—in assisting the Magistrate to enforce the Laws against all who attempt, under whatever pretences, to disturb the public order—and in discouraging that enormous licentiousness which disgraces the press, and which, *more than any thing else, endangers the Constitution.*

THE things that are most valuable and useful in themselves are the most dangerous in the abuse ; and if ever Britain should lose her Constitution, it will be by means of the PRESS. It is only from this rampart of our rights and liberties that we are assailable ; and from hence the most destructive artillery is incessantly playing on the very foundations of our security. It is, indeed, difficult to observe the daring or the insidious malignity by which many of the productions of the press are distinguished, without entertaining a serious apprehension, that the order of things must be very precarious, which may be thus insulted and attacked with impunity. The  
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vast quantity of malignant poison which is constantly poured into the public mind, cannot fail at length to produce a pernicious effect :—administered in every mode of preparation of which the press is susceptible, from the rude undisguised form of the incendiary Hand-bill, to the more elegant decoction of a Review, it must by degrees corrupt the system. The operation may, indeed, be very gradual, and almost imperceptible ; but in a moment of fermentation or convulsion the accumulated effect may be suddenly fatal. There are, indeed, those who, relying on the goodness of the British Constitution, and on the attachment which the People display in its favour, are destitute of all fear of its being injured by *such* causes. Seeing it “enthroned in “the hearts of Englishmen,” they think it proof against the arts of sedition, and the machinations of conspiracy. They dread nothing but the effect of a necessary tax in a necessary War ; and they laugh at the *alarm* of those who thought it prudent to unite in aid of the Magistracy and of the Laws, when, in pursuance of the Conventional Decrees promising Fraternity and Assistance to all People disposed to revolt against their Government, the Jacobinical Rulers of France openly conspired with the traitorous subjects of England for the subversion of our Constitution—when Clubs were formed in almost every parish to give effect to such conspiracy

—and when indefatigable pains were taken, and had long been taken, with evident success, not only to excite the desperate and abandoned, but to convince the industrious Million, that a better state of things could easily be obtained than one founded on their *ill-requited* labour, and cemented by the sweat of their brows.

ADMIRABLE as is the Constitution, the confidence of those who would trust its security to the protection of its own excellence, rather than to that of the Laws, favours much more of treachery, or at least of inconsiderate rashness, than of rational and steady attachment. Mad indeed would be the individual who, relying on the vigour of his health, should rush into the midst of contagion. The body politic, like the body natural, is full of juices, which, in the most perfect state, are easily susceptible of contamination. The social system, however perfect, requires for its preservation the constant support of that legal authority on which it is founded :—deprived thereof it would tend directly towards dissolution. Vain would be the wisest provisions for individual security, if the safety and welfare of the whole were left exposed to the inroads of licentiousness and disorder. At all times, therefore, seditious practices call for the vigilance and the vengeance of the Laws ; but at the present moment, when Sedition,

dition, encouraged by unlimited success in a neighbouring country, rears its audacious crest much higher than ever, and, in the boldness, malignity, and extent of its projects, greatly exceeds all former daring—at such a moment, every friend, not merely of the Constitution, but of Order and Society, is called upon to lend his watchfulness and his aid in support of the common cause. No pains are spared—no artifice is neglected—to subvert the ancient and noble edifice of British greatness and felicity. There is no shape which Sedition, the Arch-Fiend of Society, does not assume, to effect this destructive purpose. Proteus-like, he varies his form with the greatest facility. Now, the daring Conspirator, defying the Laws, braving the Legislature, and courting prosecution;—then, the wily Incendiary, inflaming the passions of the profligate, deluding the simplicity of the young, the ignorant \* and unwary, and infusing, by every channel that malicious ingenuity can discover, restlessness and discontent;—next, the specious Reformer, professing an enthusiastic regard for the Constitution, but calling for reform with a view to subversion;—and anon, the bold Innovator, displaying ideal forms of speculative perfection, to ensnare us to quit our solid hold of substantial felicity. If to repel these manifold attacks—these unceasing attempts

\* “ *Imperitos animos impellere.*”

to demolish by force, or to undermine by artifice, the Constitution should resort to the protection of the Laws, every obstacle that can be devised is thrown in its way to deprive it of that advantage; —every topic of a popular nature is employed to render the administration of the most essential branch of criminal justice odious or suspected: the rights of juries—the freedom of the press—the liberty of the subject—these, and many other topics are grossly perverted, to favour the escape of stirrers-up of sedition from punishment. The common felon is left to the regular and ordinary course of a fair and impartial trial, but the offender who attempts to poison the very sources of our security, is sure to find patrons whose countenance makes him bold, and whose assisting hand attends him through every stage of the proceedings. No absurdity is too gross to be urged in his behalf; and though he should have no other defence than that he did not compose, but only administer the poison, even such a defence, insulting as it is to common sense, is gravely and strenuously enforced by every possible perversion both of law and reason. And should a Jury (neither misled by the arts of sophistry, nor obliged, after a long struggle, to yield to the invincible obstinacy of a disaffected interloper) support the Constitution by their verdict,

verdict \*, the spirit of sedition, untameable as it is desperate, exults in disgrace and punishment, and from the depths of a prison issues fresh libels, more inflammatory than the first, and affects to triumph over the justice of the Country †.

To

\* Several recent verdicts have intercepted the progress of Justice against offenders who had published libels of the most flagrant kind, of the design and tendency of which to excite a spirit of disaffection to lawful authority no man in the country entertains the least doubt. Such verdicts are alarming mementos of the insecurity of every thing that is, and ought to be, dear to Englishmen ; for they prove, that the existence of the State cannot depend upon the protection of the laws. They afford triumph to sedition, and encouragement to revolt. Every such verdict is infinitely more alarming than a defeat either by sea or land.—In vain shall our fleets and armies defend us against foreign enemies, if the Laws be impotent against domestic traitors. If Juries will not support the Constitution, of which they form a main pillar, it certainly must fall ;—but they ought to consider, that they will be buried in its ruins.

† “ They manage these matters better in”—Scotland, where several daring offenders of the above class have been lately sentenced to transportation ; a sentence peculiarly apposite to such a case. For besides that a disposition to this offence is remarkably infectious, and persons contaminated thereby are indefatigably active in spreading the contagion, nothing can be more just and reasonable than that those who are dissatisfied with the Government of a Country, and who seek to subvert it, should be dismissed to another region, where they will neither have an opportunity of effectuating their mischievous designs,

To crown all the other fallacies and misrepresentations by which it is attempted to prejudice the public opinion against the War, it is charged with having for its object an interference in the Government of France, and with violating thereby those principles which are essential to the Independence of States. There cannot be a grosser perversion than is contained in the above statement, in each of its parts. It is undoubtedly true, that we have been driven to interfere in the internal concerns of France ; but that interference, far from being the *object* of the War, is resorted to as the only *means* of accomplishing such object. It has been often repeated, and obvious as it is it cannot be repeated too often, that the OBJECT of the War is SECURITY. This is all we desire, for having this we have every thing;—but it is indispensable, for without it we have nothing that we can call our own. The system which prevails in France had endangered our security as well as that of all Europe ; and we have the testimony of experience, superadded to the evidence of reason, to convince us, that the existence of that system is as

not of corrupting others with their pernicious principles. Were the Legislature to frame a law for England upon this principle, it would tend not only to the effectual preservation of our rights and liberties, but would also give great satisfaction to the real friends of law and order.

incompatible

incompatible with the safety of neighbouring States, as with the quiet of the country where it prevails. We are therefore compelled by the supreme and paramount necessity of self-preservation to interfere for the demolition of such a system. It is not for the sake of France but for our own sakes that we thus interfere. We should not pretend to a right to insist that France shall cease to be a prey to anarchy, if that anarchy did not disturb our own quiet and expose our own safety. It is not its internal effect, but its external tendency which warrants us to object to it. An interference on these grounds is no officious intermeddling. Nor is it any violation of the general rights of independent States to pursue that interference, until the danger that caused it be entirely obviated. The man will scarcely be said to infringe the general rights of personal liberty who, having turned aside the assassin's dagger, proceeds to bind and secure the villain, instead of letting him go at large to seek for another opportunity of effectuating his murderous design.

It is undoubtedly true as a general principle, that one State has no right to interfere in the Government of another State. This is a principle which should ever be held sacred, and which the present War not only recognizes but defends. It is essential to the independence of nations ; but to

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produce

produce its effect, its obligation must be universal. It must bind all, or it cannot protect any. The State that claims the benefit of its operation, must submit to its authority. The basis of the independence of States is Equality—that is, Equality as to those rights which are essential to Sovereignty. But Equality of rights cannot exist without reciprocity of duties \*. It is necessary therefore, in support of the principle contended for, that no Power should be suffered to exist which disclaims its authority :—were it to be extended to the protection of such a Power, it would be made the instrument of its own destruction. France has renounced this principle, by adopting a system of universal aggression and molestation, in open and avowed defiance of the rights of *all* other independent nations ; and she has thereby not only denied its authority in theory, but has violated it in practice. So gross and direct an infringement of the right of general security has never before existed in fact, nor, probably, in supposition. But an eminent writer on the Law of Nations (already quoted), on whose authority our right of interference with so mischievous a system was lately attempted to be denied in a Legislative Assembly, has, with a

\* From a necessary consequence of this Equality, what is permitted to one is permitted to all—and what is not permitted to one is not permitted to any other.

VATTEL—*Preliminaries, sect. 19.*

kind

kind of prophetic impulse, developed principles which fully meet the present case, and which justify both the interference itself, in the full extent to which it is carried, and the Confederacy formed with a view to provide effectually for future security. This writer observes generally, “ In  
 “ vain does Nature prescribe to nations, as  
 “ well as to individuals, the care of their self-  
 “ preservation, and of advancing their own perfec-  
 “ tion and happiness, if it does not give them  
 “ a right to preserve themselves from every  
 “ thing that can render this care ineffectual.  
 “ It is this right of preservation from all injury  
 “ that is called the *right of security*.” The viola-  
 tion of this right of security, he asserts  
 produces the right of resistance—of obtain-  
 ing reparation—and of inflicting punishment;  
 —“ which propositions,” he says, “ are so many  
 “ principles that furnish various foundations for  
 “ a just War.” But with the clearest insight in-  
 to futurity he could not have produced any thing  
 more applicable to subsisting circumstances than  
 what follows :

“ IN short, the offended has a right to provide  
 “ for his security for the future, and to punish the  
 “ offender, by inflicting upon him a pain capable  
 “ of deterring him afterwards from the like at-  
 “ tempts, and of intimidating those who shall  
 “ be tempted to imitate him. He may even, if  
 “ necessary, put the aggressor out of the condi-  
 “ tion

“ tion to injure him. He makes use of his right  
 “ in all these measures, when guided by reason ;  
 “ and if any evil results from it to him who lays  
 “ him under the necessity of acting thus, he can  
 “ accuse none but his own injustice.

“ If then there be any where a nation of a *rest-*  
 “ *less* and *mischievous* disposition, always ready to  
 “ *injure others*, to traverse their designs, and to  
 “ RAISE DOMESTIC TROUBLES ; it is not to be  
 “ doubted, that all have a right to join, in order  
 “ to repress, chastise, and put it ever after out of  
 “ its power to injure them.”

VATTEL, Book I. C. 4.

WITHOUT, however, the weight of such authority, it is self-evident, that to preserve the principle which denies the right of one State to interfere in the domestic concerns of another, we must except from its operation a Nation of freebooters and incendiaries, which, destitute of regular Government itself, seeks to deprive every other Country of that advantage. Of such an exception, it may truly be said, “ *Exceptio probat regulam.*” The application of the principle to such a case would soon reduce not only this, but every other principle of the Law of Nations to a dead letter. Nor would any thing further be  
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wanting to give full effect to the Decree of Fraternity—to the numerous other claims of France to give Law to the whole world—and to the important function ascribed to the Convention by *Danton*, when, addressing himself to that August Body, he said, “ The National Convention of France should be a Committee of Insurrection against all the Kings in the Universe.”

THE general reasoning above resorted to applies with peculiar force to the state of European society; in which it is more particularly the essential interest of every State, that other States should be subject to regular and established Government; for otherwise there would be no security whatever for the observance of the Conventional Law of Nations, and of the Stipulations of Treaties. Europe must be considered as a large community composed of divers States, which are independent of each other in their internal concerns, but intimately connected in respect of their common interests. Their mutual harmony and the welfare of all are consulted and promoted by such connection, as are the harmony and happiness of individuals by the connection arising out of Society. But the Governments at the head of the respective States are the only bond of their union, the  
only

only instruments by which that union can be formed and preserved, and the only security for mutual respect, and for an adherence to engagements. If the extensive territories of France were to be swallowed up by the ocean which washes their shores, the system of Europe would be unsettled, and its balance destroyed; great contention and disorder would take place before a new balance could be gained, and no State would be sure of preserving its proper weight in the scale. But the Anarchy of France is infinitely more injurious to other States than her annihilation could be; and it would be productive of far less general calamity, were the whole country to be blotted out from the face of the globe, than to become a source of general confusion and revolt—a burning volcano, incessantly disturbing other countries by its explosions, and pouring forth its destructive lava in every direction.

IN every point of view, therefore, the interference which is censured is in the strictest sense justifiable. It is even necessary, as well for the general security of Society, as for that of the Political System of Europe. It is necessary to obtain a reasonable ground of expectation that we shall be secure from future molestation—that Treaties shall be binding, and the Laws of Nations respected. Instead of being at variance with any established principle,

principle, it has for its object the preservation of every principle which is essential to the independence of States and the existence of civilized society. It was not assumed until the system against which it is directed had interfered with our rights as an independent people. It is the only means by which an effectual remedy can be obtained for an evil which exposes every thing that is valuable to Britons, or to mankind, to destruction. It goes, as every remedy ought, to the cause of the evil, and affords the only chance of a radical cure. Every other application would operate only as a palliative; and would at best but cicatrize the wound, leaving it to burst out again with additional violence. In short, such interference is the only road to peace; for while the Jacobin system is suffered to remain in any form, peace is evidently unattainable.

THE manner in which our interference is conducted (as well as the principles upon which it is founded), is precisely such as tends to preserve in the most effectual way the rights of independent States, and even those of France itself. The interposition which we have been compelled to make, is not carried further than the necessity by which it is created and sanctioned. We do not claim any right to dictate a Government to France. We do not pretend to exercise our own judgment re-  
specting

pecting the form of Government which may best suit that country, nor to indulge our speculations on the question, whether this or that form be better or worse as applied thereto. We only insist that a Government, solid, stable, permanent, and responsible, shall be settled; and we admit that beyond this our interference would be an unjust intrusion. Were we to assume a right to establish the happiness or the liberties of France, we might use such a pretext to cover our own views of ambition, and should at once destroy the political freedom of the country, and endanger that of every country. No idea can be more preposterous or arrogant than that of one State pretending to confer liberty on another. Such was the mask under which the French Republicans carried havoc, desolation, and dependence, into the Austrian Netherlands, Holland, Germany, and Savoy; and every civilized State is interested to disclaim a principle which in itself is unjust, and which is so liable to perversion.

INSTEAD of using our interference to cover pretences so unjustifiable, we employ it in assisting the loyal part of the French Nation to restore their lawful Government, and to place their lawful Sovereign on the Throne of his ancestors. This is as consistent with the strictest principle, as it is with the soundest policy. The existence

tence of a numerous party in that country, animated with sentiments of duty and allegiance towards their lawful Monarch, and impatient for an opportunity of giving full vent to such sentiments, is sufficiently evident, notwithstanding the immense danger of appearing at all adverse to the prevailing system of terror, cruelty, and oppression. Even the unparalleled severity which is employed to intimidate and suppress such a party, proves it to be both extensive and formidable; and indeed there seems abundant reason to conclude, that the bulk of the Nation \* is eager to fly to Royalty, as the only shelter from the miseries they endure ! To avail ourselves of such assistance, to favour and encourage such a disposition, and to co-operate with such a party, in pursuit of an object which is as favourable to the happiness of France as it is essential to our own security, must be allowed to be as justifiable as it is expedient. We also thereby secure an Ally, which at a favourable moment may render the most effectual assistance to the common cause.

It is objected, however, that this is affording assistance to restore despotism. In answer to this

\* The expression " the bulk of the nation " is not meant in a democratical disorganizing sense, as an absolute majority in point of numbers — (though perhaps even in that sense the observation would be just), but in a political sense, as denoting that reflecting part of the nation, which, though not constituting an arithmetical majority, always gives the tone and complexion to the sentiments of the Multitude in an orderly state of society.

objection it might easily be proved, that the ancient Constitution of France is not only favourable but essential to its enjoyment of a suitable portion of genuine liberty—that its re-establishment affords the only means by which that country can hope for a restoration of order—that, according to a phrase much used, it is the only rallying point for the nation—that its restoration need not be accompanied with the return of those abuses which attended the administration of its Government, which were done away before the Revolution, and which it is the interest of no party to restore—and that, independent of such advantages, a return of the former state of France, in exchange for the present, would be unspeakably advantageous in respect of liberty, order, security, and every benefit which society can produce. But such considerations are foreign to the present question.—We have no jurisdiction to determine what would be despotism, or what salutary freedom with regard to France :—nay Freedom itself would be despotism of the worst kind, if imposed upon her at the discretion of strangers. Were the Combined Powers to assist a Faction in introducing some novel scheme of Government, under pretence that it would be favourable to the happiness of France, they would arrogate to themselves a right to which they are not entitled, and which cannot exist consistently with

with the real interests of Society. They cannot in propriety exert their influence further than for the restoration of the Government that has been subverted, and because it is *that* which has been subverted—Were they even to introduce modifications into that Government (besides that such an attempt would be propostitious during the confusion of the present moment), they would step beyond the line which they are bound to observe, and assume a right incompatible with the principle which alone can warrant, and which ought to limit their interference. But in being instrumental to the restoration of the lawful and ancient Monarchy, purely and simply, they violate no principle, they exercise no alarming influence, nor establish any precedent at all dangerous for the future. Their recommendation of that Government is not founded on an opinion that it is the best Government for France, but on the consideration that, being the Government which was last established in that country, it is the only one which they can favour without assuming a right of deciding for France in that respect. In assisting to restore it, they do no more than is consistent with honour, justice, and general policy—and what it would be for the happiness and security of their own States to be done with respect to themselves, if their lawful authority had been obliged by rebellion to give place to desolating Anarchy. Should the Monarchy of France be reinstated

reinstated through the interference of the Combined Powers, being founded in ancient right, it would not derive its authority from the assistance by which it is restored, but from antecedent title, and it would instantly resume its original independence with regard to other States. But were any other Government to arise under their auspices (supposing that any other system could be rendered permanent), the Government of France, instead of being restored, would in a manner be prescribed by a foreign force, and a foreign influence might be exerted to maintain, or to modify, what it had been the means of establishing. Thus would a manifest violation be made of the principle, that one State has no right to interfere in the internal government of another—the independence of France would be destroyed—that of other countries shaken—a source of future disturbances and Revolutions would be opened—and the other Powers would not only defeat their grand object of establishing general security on a solid and permanent basis, but would also introduce a precedent which might at some future time be *turned against themselves*. In short, the security of all lawful Government—the well-being of Society—the freedom and independence of States—the repose of Europe and of mankind—the interest of the present age and of posterity, seem to require, that the French Revolution should be terminated by the re-establishment of that legitimate authority, the subversion of which has produced so many calamities.

T H E E N D.